Gerdon v. State Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 39300 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
1-8-2013
Gerdon v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39300
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Gerdon v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 39300" (2013). Not Reported. 654.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/654
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JAMES GERDON, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No.39300 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF TWIN FALLS 
HONORABLE G. RICHARD BEVAN 
District Judge 
STEPHEN D. THOMPSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
I.S.B. # 5714 
P.O. Box 1707 
Ketchum, Idaho 83340 
(208)726-4518 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PETITIONER-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings .............................................................................. 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 3 
" A. The District Court Erred when it dismissed Mr. Gerdon's Amended. Successive 
Petition for Post~Conviction Relief as untimely and as a successive petition, because 
the doctrine of equitable tolling should have applied to allow the Amended Successive 
Petition ........................................................................................................................ 3 
1. Mr. Gerdon's Petition should have been allowed under LC. 19-4901 ...... 4 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 7 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ................................................................................ 8 
I. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Baker v. State, 142 Idaho 411, 128 P.3d 948 (2007) ................................................. 4, 5 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 875 (2007) ................................... 3, 4, 5 
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007) ........................................ 3, 4, 7 
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,351 (1996) ....................................................... 5 
STATUTES 
1.C. § 19-4901 ............................................................................................. 4 
1.C. § 19-4902 .......................................................................................... 3 
,· 
:, 
!; \ 
1.C. § 19-4903 ........................................................................................... 3 
1.C. § 19-4908 .......................................................................................... 3 
ii 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
James Gerdon appeals from the district court's memorandum opinion dated 
September 30, 2011 dismissing his amended successive petition for post convicition 
reli8f (R., pp, 311-322), and the district court's judgment of dismissal, filed October 7, 
2011 (R., p. 324). Mr. Gerdon asserts that the district court erred by dismissing f·lis 
petition for post-conviction relief and by failing to reconsider its dismissal. 
8. Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Gerdon had pleaded guilty to sexual abuse of a minor, lewd conduct with a 
minor and attempted lewd conduct with a minor on November 10, 4003. He was 
sentenced thereon to a total of fifteen years fixed and fifteen years indeterminate, all 
sentences to run concurrently. (R. 312). Mr, Gerdon filed an appeal, but the case was 
affirmed on May 19, 2005. (R. 312). 
On October 20, 2004, Mr. Gerdon filed his first petition for post-conviction relief. 
It was summarily dismissed on June 28, 2006. (R. 312). There was apparently 
confusion as to when Mr. Gerdon received notice of the dismissal, with Mr. Gerdon 
writing to the district judge to inquire regarding the status of his case. The district judge 
sent him a copy of the memorandum opinion, and Mr. Gerdon wrote back requesting an 
affidavit for purposes of appeal. (R. 318). Mr. Gardon then filed an untimely appeal that 
was dismissed due to the untimeliness. (R. 318). 
Mr. Gerdon filed his second petition for post-conviction relief claiming ineffective 
assistance of counsel during his first post-conviction on April 21, 2008. This petition 
1 
was dismissed on May 6, 2009. (R. 313, 318). Mr. Gerdon appealed, but voluntarily 
dimissed his appeal. (R. 313}. 
On June 21, 2010, Mr. Gerdon filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief 
with, along with a supporting affidavit, alleging ineffective assistance of prior post-
conviction counsel for failure to assert ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to 
file a motion to suppress and failing to object to restitution. (R. 313-314). · 
Throughout Mr. Gerdon's contentions, he maintained that he did not have 
effective communication with his attorneys and that therefore he had ineffective 
assistance of counsel at the trial stage, appelfate stage, and during his post-convictions. 
(See, eg., Tr. pg. 51, Line 1 - pg. 68, Line 7}. Because he was unable to effectively 
communicate with his attorneys, and as a result, his arguments were never presented 
properly, Mr. Gerdon argued that his successive post-conviction petition should be 
allowed. Id. 
Ultimately, the District Court denied the motion to reconsider and dismissed the 
petition for post-conviction relief in its memorandum decision. {R. 311-322),, and 
entered an order dismissing the petition for post-conviction relief. (R. 324). 
Mr. Gerdon timely filed his appeal. (R 326~328}. 
II. RESTATED ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Gerdon's Amended 
Successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a 
successive petition, because the doctrine of equitable tolling should 
have applied to allow the Amended Successive Petition? 
? 
Ill. ARGUMENT 
A. 
The District Court Erred when it dismissed Mr. Gerdon's Amended Successive Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief as untimely and as a successive petition. because the 
doctrine of equitable tolling should have applied to allow the Amended Successive 
Petition. 
As stated in Appellant's opening brief, a petition for post-conviction relief under the 
Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is a civil action in nature. Workman v. 
State, 144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007). Under Idaho Code§ 19-4903, the 
petitioner must prove the claims upon which the petition is based by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. 
A claim for post-conviction relief must be filed within one year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the determination 
of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever proceeding is later. I.C. § 19-4902. 
Successive petitions are impermissible "unless the court finds a ground for relief 
asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the 
original, supplemental, or amended application.11 I .C. § 19-4908. 
Also as noted in the opening brief, Section 19-4908 sets forth no fixed time within 
which successive petitions may be filed, however, the "sufficient reason" tanguage in 
the statute necessarily provides "a reasonable time within which such claims [may be] 
asserted in a successive post-conviction petition, once those claims are known." 
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900,905, 174 P.3d 870, 875 (2007). The determination 
of what is a reasonable time is considered by the courts on a case-by-case basis. Id. 
An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post-
conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if 
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented 
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State, 
142 Idaho 411,420, 128 P.3d 948,957 {Ct. App. 2005). Further, a petiit?ner asserting 
ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel as the "sufficient .reason" for 
failing to adequately assert a claim in the original post-conviction action must satisfy a 
two-le'lel burden of proof. First, the petitioner must demonstrate that ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel caused the inadequate presentation of a claim in 
the first petition. See id. Second, the petitioner must prove the underlying claim that was 
inadequately presented and upon which relief is sought. See Workman, 144 Idaho at 
522, 164 P.3d at 802. 
1. Mr. Gerdon contends that his Petition should have been allowed under I.C. 19-
Mr. Gerdon's contends that the district court erred by failing to allow his petition 
under f.C. § 14~4901, and Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, f74 P.3d 870, 
874 (2007). Mr. Gerdon argues that he has made a substantial factual showing that his 
claim for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and 
cou:d not have, in the exercise of due diligence, been raised earlier, allowing a 
successive petition under LC. § 19-4901. He contends that the ineffectiveness of his 
attorney at his first post-conviction prevented him from properly presenting his 
arguments. Id. Also importantly, Mr. Gerdon has argued that because he did not 
receive his legal mail, he was deprived of reasonable access to the c.ou~s such that he 
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A. 
was hindered and/or prevented from filing a timely petition, and from properly pursuing it 
via his attorneys. See, eg., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). 
An "allegation that a claim was not adequately presented in the first post-
conviction action due to the ineffective assistance of prior post-conviction counsel, if 
true, provides sufficient reason for permitting issues that were inadequately presented 
to be presented in a subsequent application for post-conviction relief." Baker v. State, 
142 Idaho 411,420, 128 P.3d 948, 957 (Ct. App. 2005). 
As stated above, throughout Mr. Gerdon's case, he maintained that he did not 
L 
,, 
have effective communication with his attorneys and that therefore hiJ had ineffective 
assistance of counsel at the trial stage, appellate stage, and during his poc:;t-convictions. 
(Tr. pg. 51, Line 1 - pg. 68, Line 7. Tr. pg. 99, Line 13, - pg. 109, Line 24). Particularly, 
he did not have effective phone or mail communciation when he was in custody out of 
state during his initial appeal period and ·first and second post-convictions and even into 
February, 2011 after he filed the post-conviction that is the basis for this appeal. (Tr. 
pg. 103, Line 16 - pg. 107, Line 15). Because he was unable to effectively communicate 
with his attorneys, and because thereby his arguments were never presented properly, 
Mr. Gerdon argued that his successive post-conviction petition should be allowed. Mr. 
Gerdon also specifically tendered exhibits into evidence at his evidenti:~_ry hearing that 
,•; 
demonstrated he had trouble with his legal mail, (Tr. pg. 110, Line 22 - pg. 126, Line 21, 
Exhibits 1 - 24), and that as a result, he could not communicate effectively with his 
attorneys, and that therefore, his points were not adequately presented af; dlscussed in 
Charboneau and Baker. Because they were not adequately presented, including the 
claim regarding the failure to file and properly argue the motion to suppress. Mr. 
Gerdort contends that he is not barred by res judicata from pursuing a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel on that issue because his first post-conviction attorney 
did not communicate with him, and he was not abfe to properly present the argument. 
Further, Mr. Gerdon presented testimony that he did not have access to Idaho 
legal authority as he was held out of state, and that for that additional reason, his 
arguments were not presented adequately previously. (Tr. pg. 127, Lines 4 ~ 18). 
The district court, in denying relief to Mr. Gerdon, noted that "equitable tollingn as 
discussed by Charboneau, has been applied only in cases of mental disease and/or 
psychotropic medication, or when a petitioner was incarcerated out of state on an in-
state c;onviction without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials. (R. 
316). Mr. Gerdon has contended that he has submitted evidence of being deprived to 
effective access to the courts due to his lack of communication with his attorneys, which 
Jed directly to the failure of his first post-conviction attorney to pursue the search warrant 
issue, and/or pursue the restitution issue. First, due to being housed out of state, and/or 
due to the communication issues he documented, he did not have access to legal 
representation in any effective sense. Second, he did not have access to Idaho legal 
materials. The record before the district court showed even that there w~;s no evidence 
Mr. Gerdon received notice of the June 28, 2006 decision until after 42 days had 
passed. Therefore, Mr. Gerdon's problems with his legal mail cost him the ability to file 
a timely appeal. This is one more example of how Mr. Gerdon did not have effective 
access to the courts. 
It is Mr. Gerdon's position that the problems with communication with the courts 
R 
and his attorneys caused him to be untimely in filing his appeal from nl~ first post-
conviction. 
Therefore, it is Mr. Gerdon's contention that his third post-conviction petition 
should have been allowed, based on the claim of innefective assistance of his prior 
post-conviction counsel, and due to that ineffective representation, the conduct of his 
trial and appellate counsel. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, Mr. Gerdon respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this _J_ day of January, 2013. 
L 
STePHEND.TH0MPSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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